The Battle of Britain

FactsBattle fact sheet

Move 1The board: the side with more pieces was not the side with more fighters

After the fall of France, Germany has air bases from northern Norway to Brittany. On 10 August 1940, the Luftwaffe has 3,358 aircraft against England, 2,550 of them serviceable, divided into three air fleets: Kesselring's, in Belgium and the Pas-de-Calais, against the southeast and London; Sperrle's, in France, against the west; Stumpff's, in Norway, against the north. Hugh Dowding's Fighter Command had 754 single-seat fighters on 1 July.

The count that decides, however, is a different one. Only the fighter contests the sky, and in ready single-seat fighters the difference was small: 805 German ones on 10 August, according to Wood and Dempster. And the British side was gaining pieces: according to Richard Overy, Fighter Command had 1,061 fighters on strength on 3 August and 1,161 on 7 September, in the middle of the hardest phase.

The German objective was written down. Directive No. 16, of 16 July, orders preparations for the invasion; No. 17, of 1 August, orders air superiority to be won first. The plan of 6 August allows four days to destroy Fighter Command in the south and four weeks for the rest. The German navy, which would have to cross the Channel under the Royal Navy, had already concluded in November 1939 that the air was not enough: the sea was needed too.

Move 2The piece that does not appear on the board: Dowding's network

The British defense was not an aircraft, it was a system. Chain Home radar stations, on the coast and facing the sea, saw the German formations while they were still assembling over France. Once the aircraft crossed the coast, they left the radar's field, and the ones tracking them were the Observer Corps, volunteers at posts scattered across the interior, by eye and ear.

Everything converged by telephone on the filter room at Bentley Priory, which merged the reports from several stations about the same formation into a single track. From there the information went down to the group operations rooms, which chose which squadron to send, and to the sector rooms, which guided the fighters by radio to the target and controlled the area's anti-aircraft artillery. The result is that the RAF did not need to patrol: it took off when and where it needed to, and spared aircraft and pilots.

The Germans knew about British radar. What they did not understand was the network. The intelligence report of 16 July 1940, the basis for the commanders' plans, judged British control to be rigid and the fighters tied to their bases. On 12 August, aircraft of Erprobungsgruppe 210 attacked four radar stations; three went off the air and were back within six hours. After 18 August, Göring suspended the attacks on radar, judging them useless. The piece that held up the entire defense stopped being a target.

Move 3From the Channel to the airfields: the attack that did not know where to strike

From 4 July, the Luftwaffe attacks the convoys in the English Channel; in August the British navy gives up sending them through there. On 13 August, Adlertag, Eagle Day, opens the main attack on the RAF. On the very first day, German bombers hit Eastchurch, a Coastal Command base, and claim ten Spitfires destroyed on the ground. No Fighter Command fighter was lost there, and the Luftwaffe went back to Eastchurch seven times believing it was a fighter base.

On 15 August, the air fleet from Norway attacks northern England believing the defense was all in the south. The Bf 109 did not have the range to escort it. Of 115 bombers and 35 fighters, 75 aircraft were destroyed, and it did not return in force. On 18 August, the hardest day, both sides suffer the highest casualties of the campaign, and the Ju 87 dive bomber leaves the battle.

From 24 August to 6 September, Kesselring concentrates the blow on the airfields of Park, who defends the southeast and London: of 33 heavy attacks, 24 were against airfields. Park recorded extensive damage at five forward airfields and at six of the seven sector stations. From 26 August to 6 September, the RAF loses 248 aircraft and the Luftwaffe 322. This is the phase that Wood and Dempster and Denis Richards's official history call critical. Dowding, in a letter to Trenchard, wrote that in those weeks the Luftwaffe achieved very little: the only sector station put out of action, Biggin Hill, was out of operation for two hours.

Move 4The enemy that German intelligence invented

The same report of 16 July estimated that British industry produced 180 to 300 front-line fighters per month, and predicted a decline. Under the ministry created on 14 May 1940 for Lord Beaverbrook, 496 new fighters came out in July, 467 in August and 467 in September, according to Overy — more than the RAF was losing. The civilian repair organization returned 4,955 aircraft to service by December.

On top of that came the claims. Both sides claimed two to three times what they shot down: from July to September, the RAF claimed 2,698 aircraft and the German fighters 3,198. The Luftwaffe believed it was wearing down Fighter Command three times faster than it really was. On 3 September, Göring decides to bomb London daily on the basis of reports that the British squadrons were down to 5 to 7 fighters out of 12.

The real bottleneck was something else: trained pilots. Replacements reached the squadrons with nine hours of flying and no gunnery training. Here the sources differ. For Wood and Dempster, the RAF was losing pilots faster than it trained them; for Peter Dye and Richard Overy, the available pilots never decreased, and the Germans had even fewer — Overy sums up that, if Fighter Command were the few, the German fighter pilots were fewer still. And there was an asymmetry of the board: a British pilot shot down over England flew again; a German one became a prisoner, or fell into the Channel.

Move 5London, 7 and 15 September

On the night of 24 to 25 August, bombs fall on London. On the following night, Bomber Command attacks Berlin for the first time. On 30 August Hitler lifts the ban on bombing London, and on 4 September he publicly presents the attacks on the capital as reprisal. But London was already in the German plan of 6 August as the final blow of the campaign, and Göring decided believing the RAF was finished. On 7 September, nearly 400 bombers and more than 600 fighters attack the East End docks.

The change of target took the pressure off the airfields, and lengthened the journey: over London, the Bf 109 had about ten minutes of combat before turning back. On 14 September, Hitler acknowledges that air superiority does not yet exist and postpones the decision to the 17th.

On 15 September two large waves come against London. Park puts all of No. 11 Group in the air; Churchill, in the Uxbridge operations room, asks about the reserves and is told there are none. The Germans, who believed they were facing the last British fighters, find the sky full. The Air Ministry announced 175 to 185 aircraft shot down; the German loss was about 60. Two days later, Hitler postpones Sea Lion until further notice.

Move 6The fight inside the winning side: Park versus Leigh-Mallory

Park sent single squadrons against each raid, early, to break up the formations before the target. Leigh-Mallory, of No. 12 Group, and Douglas Bader advocated the Big Wing, three to five squadrons together. The large formation was slow to assemble — 20 minutes on 7 September — and No. 12 Group, which was supposed to cover Park's airfields while his squadrons were in the air, often arrived late.

The Big Wing also inflated the numbers: on 15 September it accounted for about a third of the 185 victories announced. A report by Park submitted by Dowding on 15 November counted, from 11 September to 31 October, 10 interceptions and one German aircraft destroyed through extensive use of the tactic. Dowding was replaced in November 1940, also because of the failure of the night defense in the Blitz; Park, in December, by Leigh-Mallory himself. Stephen Bungay considers the strategy of the two men vindicated.

VerdictWhy it ended the way it did

MythsWhat is told and what the record shows

• What is told

  It was the few against the many.

  What the record shows

  Churchill's phrase, of 20 August 1940, is one of gratitude, not arithmetic. In total the Luftwaffe had more than twice as many aircraft, but in ready single-seat fighters the difference was small, and the RAF produced more fighters and, according to Peter Dye and Richard Overy, had more fighter pilots available than the Luftwaffe during the battle. Overy: if Fighter Command were the few, the German fighter pilots were fewer still.

• What is told

  The Spitfire won the Battle of Britain.

  What the record shows

  The Hurricane was the most numerous fighter — 29 squadrons against 19 of Spitfires in July 1940, in one count — and accounted for more than 60% of the victories claimed by the RAF. It was also the most lost: 753 Hurricanes against 467 Spitfires. The percentages are of claims, which both sides inflated.

• What is told

  London was bombed by mistake, Churchill retaliated on Berlin, and Hitler, furious, switched from the airfields to London — the mistake that lost the battle.

  What the record shows

  The bombing of London on the night of 24 to 25 August 1940 is attributed by some historians to aircraft that missed their target, a version disputed by those who see three separate drops that night. The raid on Berlin happened, and Hitler presented London as reprisal. But the capital was already in the German plan of 6 August as the final blow, and Göring decided on 3 September believing the RAF was finished. Whether the switch lost the battle is debated: Dowding wrote that the attacks on the airfields had achieved very little.

• What is told

  On 15 September 1940 the RAF shot down 185 German aircraft.

  What the record shows

  That was the Air Ministry's announcement, 175 to 185. The German loss was about 60. The day mattered because the Luftwaffe, convinced it was facing the last British fighters, found the whole of No. 11 Group in the air — and two days later Hitler postponed the invasion.

• What is told

  The Polish 303 was the squadron that shot down the most aircraft in the battle.

  What the record shows

  It was the one that claimed the most: 126 victories in six weeks, up to 11 October 1940. The verified number differs: about 55 to 60 according to Jerzy Cynk and other Polish historians, which keeps it in first place; 44 according to John Alcorn, which puts it fourth, behind three Spitfire squadrons.

QuestionsFrequently asked questions

SourcesSources

1. Battle of Britain (Enemy Losses), Hansard, House of Commons, 14 May 1947 — answer by the Air Minister, Philip Noel-Baker. — api.parliament.uk
2. RAF Museum, History of the Battle of Britain — phase 3 (13 August to 6 September 1940). — rafmuseum.org.uk
3. RAF Museum, "15 September 1940", podcast transcript, 2015. — rafmuseum.org.uk
4. Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain, 2000 (cited by English Wikipedia).
5. Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality, 2001 (cited by English Wikipedia).
6. Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin, 1961 (cited by English Wikipedia).
7. John T. Correll, "How the Luftwaffe Lost the Battle of Britain", Air & Space Forces Magazine, August 2008. — airandspaceforces.com
8. John Curatola, "The Battle of Britain: The (Not So) Few", The National WWII Museum, 2023. — nationalww2museum.org
9. John Lock, "The Battle of Britain: but for a few misplaced bombs", Military History Matters, 2022. — the-past.com
10. Battle of Britain — English Wikipedia. — en.wikipedia.org
11. Battle of Britain Day — English Wikipedia. — en.wikipedia.org
12. Dowding system — English Wikipedia. — en.wikipedia.org
13. No. 303 Squadron RAF — English Wikipedia. — en.wikipedia.org
14. Operation Sea Lion — English Wikipedia. — en.wikipedia.org

Images

• Fig. 01 — The Fighter Command Sector G operations room at Duxford, Cambridgeshire, in September 1940: the controller, the telephone operators and, on the right, the army liaison officer who directed the anti-aircraft artillery. This is where the radar track became an order for a squadron.: Stanley Devon, official photographer · Imperial War Museums, CH 1401 · Public domain
• Fig. 02 — WAAF and RAF operators in the receiver hut of the Chain Home radar station at Ventnor, on the Isle of Wight, during the Battle of Britain. The coastal stations saw the German formations while they were still assembling over France.: Royal Air Force official photographer · Imperial War Museums, C 1868 · Public domain
• Fig. 03 — WAAF telephone operators in the Duxford operations room receive the plots from the Observer Corps posts, in September 1940. Once the aircraft crossed the coast, radar could no longer see them: tracking over land was done by volunteer observers.: Stanley Devon, official photographer · Imperial War Museums, CH 1404 · Public domain
• Fig. 04 — Pilots of No. 303 (Polish) Squadron with one of their Hurricanes in October 1940. The squadron claimed 126 victories in six weeks; the verified number ranges from 44 to about 60, depending on the historian.: Stanley Devon, official photographer · Imperial War Museums, CH 1535 · Public domain
• Fig. 05 — Hurricane Mk Is of No. 85 Squadron, based at Church Fenton, Yorkshire, led by Squadron Leader Peter Townsend, in 1940. The Hurricane was the RAF's most numerous fighter and accounted for more than 60% of the victories claimed in the battle.: B. J. Daventry, Royal Air Force official photographer · Imperial War Museums, CH 1503 · Public domain